The American Loyalists: Notes on Their Organization and Numerical Strength
Paul H. Smith* INADEQUATE knowledge of the American loyalists continues to distort our understanding of the American revolutionary era. Surely no subject so central to interpretation of the Revolution still remains so poorly understood or comparatively ignored. R. R. Palmer's not too recent indictment that the loyalists have been eliminated from the national consciousness-and from the work of the "consensus" historiansis a serious accusation that continues to be taken altogether too lightly.1 For we can hardly determine whether the Revolution originated in social and economic unrest, in deep-seated ideological tensions, or in a constitutional dilemma until we take seriously the activities of the loyalists during the Revolution. Nor are we likely to decide whether it was basically a "radical" upheaval or a movement to defend rights already long enjoyed until we understand more precisely how the Revolution affected those who opposed it with their lives.
Although such interpretive differences have many complex roots, a basic lack of quantitative information often lies near the center of the most serious problems that plague historians of the loyalists. We stand in particular need of statistical data on the loyalists, otherwise they will continue to be ignored as something of an unknown quantity, an invention of historians, more imaginary than real. We are caught, it would appear, in a vicious circle, on the one hand indifferent to the loyalists because they are difficult to incorporate into our basic conception of the rebellion against Britain, and on the other reluctant to modify our interpretations because we lack data on the loyalists sufficient to justify major revisions.
However, at present we undeniably lack the required statistical foundation for reaching a solid understanding of the loyalists in the Revolution. Because of this lack of knowledge, historians commonly resort to general population percentages when speaking of the loyalists, understandably exhibiting strong preferences for the security and appeal of round figures and easily remembered proportions. Hence the acceptance and authority for example, has been given to the fact that loyalism meant different things to different persons in different situations. Matters of allegiance to established government seldom appear as clear-cut choices. The loyalty of officeholders and wealthy persons closely allied to the machinery of government involved decisions fundamentally dissimilar to those made by tenants, indentured servants, poor mechanics, and artisans who were induced by cash bounties to join loyalist regiments. Residents of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia did not have the same opportunities to escape involvement in the war that were afforded western Virginians and North Carolinians. Men joining the royal cause in the spring of I782 in the Carolinas probably did so from motives far different from those of loyalists fleeing inside the British lines in New York and New Jersey in the autumn of I776. And undoubtedly more than a few persons, on both sides, were periodically involved in overt activities that betrayed their true interests and opinions.
Finally, historians are plagued by the absence of many types of precise demographic data for the eighteenth century as a whole.6 We can only guess at the total population of the colonies during the Revolution and have comprehensive population figures for few individual colonies. We know little about the profile of the American population and can only estimate birth and death statistics. Rates of immigration and internal migration remain largely unknown. Consequently, historians of the eighteenth century have frequently avoided topics which involve precise statistical information or conclusions derived from computations based on dependable data.
The present study-which seeks only to establish a more precise approximation of the loyalists' strength-began not at all as a statistical inquiry but rather grew out of an interest in the influence of the loyalists on British policy during the Revolution. In the course of that research, however, I accumulated a quantity of information on the strength of the loyalist military units which, incomplete as it was, I found to be more comprehensive and accurate than data that historians had previously collected. Intrigued by the uses to which such information could be put and confident that more significant conclusions could yet be reached about both the loyalists' military strength and their overall numbers, I subsequently pursued two simple preliminary assumptions that led finally to the conclusion of this study: first, that the total cumulative strength of the loyalist regiments in the British army could be established fairly accurately through a more thorough, systematic search of surviving manuscripts, and second, that the total strength of the loyalists could be projected from the strength of the loyalist regiments if I could determine what proportion of all loyalists joined loyalist corps. The search for additional data on the loyalist regiments was rather successful, especially in locating information on deaths, desertions, and discharges in the loyalist corps in order to calculate their rates of attrition-hitherto the greatest gap in data on the loyalist soldier. This information (presented in tabular form in Table I ), though of necessity approximate and subject to revisions, appears to me to provide as accurate conclusions as surviving data are likely to yield. It represents the great bulk of the research upon which this study is based. For those who wish to go beyond statistics on the loyalist corps to the more interesting and significant, if more speculative *and perhaps foolhardy, projection of the total numerical strength of the loyalists, I have summarized my conclusions on this question as well.
From a few weeks before the war began at Lexington Green until several weeks after the Treaty of Paris was actually ratified over eight years later, large numbers of loyalists volunteered their services in "provincial" corps operating with His Majesty's army, and a remarkably complete record of these military units is preserved in several collections of surviving British manuscripts." They constitute a rich, neglected vein of data, in contrast to the general paucity of loyalist manuscript material. From time to time, to be sure, historians have worked these resources, particularly local historians who have focused their inquiries on the history of specific loyalist battalions, but to date no comprehensive effort has been made to draw systematically from such documents to establish accurately from extant British records the overall numerical strength of the provincial corps or of the American loyalists in general. Thus I have attempted to obtain from these sources all the information To give meaning to the figures obtained from the provincial muster rolls, military pay warrants, and other surviving records, one must make several essential distinctions in the process of evaluating the data. First, the men who served in the various units which made up the Provincial Service in the British army were a species of "regular soldier" and are not to be confused with volunteer "associators" or militiamen.8 Unlike those loyalists who temporarily enrolled in the militia from time to time, the provincials were full time soldiers serving fixed terms,9 subject to service wherever ordered to duty, not merely within the borders of their native province.'0 It is also necessary to recognize that a number of provincial soldiers were not actually loyalists in any meaningful sense, for many officers and non-commissioned officers were actually British regulars, not provincials." Finally, a considerable number of the provincial troops were recruited outside the thirteen colonies (in Nova Scotia, East and West Florida, and Quebec), or had arrived in America only shortly before the rebellion, and similarly ought not to be classified as loyalists.
Important as these distinctions are, they represent but a few of the problems that must be considered if one is to make the provincial muster rolls of the British army yield useful conclusions about the strength of the American loyalists during the Revolution. The North administration made no comprehensive contemporary studies of the Provincial Service, and the records that were maintained are but a form Difficult as it is to follow the complex development of the Provincial Service, with the appearance and disappearance of the various units on the rolls, it is even more difficult to calculate the attrition rate within the loyalist corps. Relatively few accurate tabulations of loyalists who were killed in action, died of disease, or were discharged because of serious wounds, survive for the use of historians. Establishing the rate of desertion and bounty-jumping in the provincial corps presents several nearly insoluble problems. And one can only with difficulty estimate from the meager data that survives the number of "seconded" provincial officers who were dropped from active duty when superseded in various reorganizational moves, or while ill, wounded, or captured were unavailable for immediate service.
Thus the figures in Table I have not been simply transferred directly from the muster rolls, but have been extrapolated by analyzing the growth and decline of the Provincial Service, and the creation, reorganization, and reduction of individual corps. The data rests upon a large number of army returns and muster rolls, loyalist petitions and claims, military accounts and pay warrants, the annual lists of British officers, and several miscellaneous journals and contemporary accounts dealing with the British army. The following explanations are provided to clarify the meaning of the data tabulated in Table I . The reader should be aware of the limitations of the surviving data upon which this compilation is based and of the necessarily conjectural nature of the conclusions that follow.
The "Maximum strength (Known)" in column one simply states the total number (taken directly from muster rolls or reports of the inspector general) of officers and men enrolled in each unit at the time it reported its greatest strength. As the various corps seldom achieved their maximum strength simultaneously-the specific moment for various individual units may have been any time between 1776 and 1782-addition of the figures in column one produces no meaningful total. In general the figures in column two are fragmentary-comprehensive data survive in the muster rolls of only a few corps-but taken collectively they suggest a great deal about the overall attrition rate in the Provincial Service, and in conjunction with evidence extracted from related memorials, journals, letter books, and treasury records, they provide the basis for the general estimates in column three. Although a great number of officer lists exist, the returns in themselves are incomplete and require careful study and comparative analysis. The figures in column four generally indicate the total number of officers whose names appear on various surviving lists of officers that were compiled over a period of several years, but occasionally estimates have been made to fill in obvious gaps that remain in such data and to assign officers to specific units where membership is not clearly or accurately designated. The total cumulative membership of each unit can generally be calculated with fair accuracy through chronological comparison of returns for successive years and computation of the men lost through deaths, discharges, desertions, and "seconding." The totals in column five have been calculated directly from manuscript records, while column six is a final estimate of the cumulative number of officers and men who were members of each corps throughout the war. (See Table I , pp. 27I-277.) Of the approximately 2I,000 men who saw service in the provincial corps during the War for Independence, a rather sizable number clearly cannot be labeled loyalists. Indeed, probably no more than i9,000 can be so classified if any meaningful definition is applied that evaluates the residence of the provincial troops before the outbreak of hostilities. 24My initial calculations, which were not rounded off, produced the rather arbitrary number 513,200, from my statistics showing i9,000 actual loyalists in provincial corps, a 895/6025 (14.8%) ratio of provincial troops to adult male loyalists, and a I:4 ratio of adult male loyalists to the whole number represented in loyalist families. Because those calculations rest upon some rather tentative figures, several subjective decisions, and a bastard methodology, one can make no claim to such precision. 25 It is now believed that the population of the colonies was about 2,507,000 in 1775, 2,780,ooo in I780, and 3,929,000 in I790 when the first federal census was taken. Thus the population in I783 was undoubtedly very close to 2,950,000. To produce the rate of growth suggested by the above figures, a net increase of births over deaths of 22 per iooo annually is required, assuming a moderate net population decline from emigration. J. Potter's recent study of American population growth during the i8th century suggests that this probably meant a birth rate in the range of 45-50 per i000 and a death rate of 23-28 per Iooo. If the American birth rate did The uncertain statistical foundation upon which these conclusions are based limit building the present structure beyond this point. Further precision can be purchased only at the cost of more carefully refined, and proportionately meaningless, definitions. At best, all such figures have limited meaning, for efforts to classify persons in a revolution run afoul of insuperable problems of definition. The War for American Independence, like most wars, simply does not conform to common assumptions. Too large an event for most persons to comprehend in its entirety, the Revolution was often perceived in terms of immediate, commonplace local issues. Relatively few Americans experienced it directly for any prolonged period. For many more, the issue of their allegiance was never perceived as a matter upon which they might exercise some meaningful choice.27 It is enough, perhaps, that we know more precisely how many Americans the British formally employed in suppressing the rebellion and what proportion of the whole number of loyalists found opportunities to take up arms as regular soldiers in the cause of their king. 
